War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity by Scheffer, David J.
Pace International Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 2 Fall 1999 Article 2
September 1999
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
David J. Scheffer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
David J. Scheffer, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 11 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 319 (1999)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/2
BLAINE SLOAN LECTURE
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY
David J. Scheffert
I. INTRODUCTION
We deal daily with the horrific handicraft of genocidaire, of
torturers, of butchers, or of poorly trained soldiers who commit
unjustified violence against civilians or abuse prisoners of war.
Today eighty percent of the victims of armed conflicts are civil-
ians. Tidy theories and international conventions on the laws of
war seem to mean very little to the perpetrators of atrocities if
they are aware of them at all. Yet, it is our duty to translate
those words into meaningful and enforceable instruments of
law. At stake is not our freedom to conduct the just war justly,
but the chance to save the lives of countless civilians and their
means of shelter and livelihood from those whose pursuit of
power knows no bounds.
The challenge of deterring serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law in the Twenty-first Century - by which
I mean genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs
of war, first requires that we recognize the problem generated
during the Twentieth Century, particularly in its final decades.
Conventional warfare has been transformed in our lifetimes.
Armed conflicts have become increasingly identified not with
the clash of armies across sovereign borders, or between the
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"isms," but with the assault by a government and its military on
its own population, or by a rebel force bent on terrorizing its
own society, or by the use of weapons that have as their aim
indiscriminate mass murder. It is difficult to find an armed con-
flict anywhere in the world today where one could describe the
regular armed forces of two countries as waging conventional
cross-border warfare between themselves and generally observ-
ing the laws of war. The norm has become the internal conflict
or self-inflicted atrocity, often with foreign influence at work to
ensure a bloody outcome. Such situations are not easily influ-
enced by the strictures of law, which are little known or under-
stood by those who control the firepower. The perpetrators of
war crimes and crimes against humanity do not, under such cir-
cumstances, bring a keen knowledge of law to their work. In
fact, as I walk through one massacre site after another in dis-
tant reaches of the globe, I have to ponder whether the laws of
war have been of any relevance at all to this insanity.
My intention this evening is to focus on four challenges in
the field of international humanitarian law. First, I will ad-
dress the disturbing phenomenon of the post-Cold War world,
namely the prominence of internal conflicts and assaults on ci-
vilian populations. I want to discuss one example: Sierra Le-
one, and our efforts in Washington to create a more effective
preventive mechanism to respond to prospective or on-going
atrocities. Second, we need to recognize the important work of
the two existing international criminal tribunals as instru-
ments of deterrence, and the continuing need to address the
crimes of our own era if we are to sustain a credible policy of
deterrence. Third, I will examine the new treaty to establish a
permanent international criminal court and U.S. views about
that treaty. This would be the central institution of deterrence,
but we must consider seriously its content and structure and its
impact on military capabilities to confront atrocities and main-
tain international peace and security. Fourth, I will briefly de-
scribe the United States Administration's efforts with respect to
some other treaties.
II. THE WAR AGAINST CMLIANS-SIERRA LEONE
I visited Sierra Leone last month. What has happened
there might serve as a paradigm for an inquiry into what would
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deter war crimes in the next century. The setting is West Af-
rica, far from the secure neighborhoods of Westchester County.
But what is happening in Sierra Leone should serve as a warn-
ing of the clear and present danger that war crimes pose to civi-
lization in our own time.
While the world's attention has been focused on the Janu-
ary massacre of forty-five civilians at Racak, Kosovo, and the
resulting peace talks in Rambouillet, France, the atrocities in
Sierra Leone are far greater in number and severity. The mag-
nitude of massacres, mutilations, tortures, rapes, and destruc-
tion of civilian property in Sierra Leone is so great that its full
extent is unknown. Eighty percent of Eastern Freetown has
been destroyed, and looting and fire have gutted key buildings
in Central Freetown. While as many as 5,000 civilians were
slaughtered in Freetown in the last two months alone, that
number almost certainly only represents a fraction of the casu-
alties in the two-thirds of Sierra Leone now under rebel control.
UNICEF' reports that 1,192 children are missing after the at-
tack on Freetown. Due to lack of security, humanitarian agen-
cies have access to only 300,000 of the 700,000 to 1,000,000
internally displaced people. Sierra Leone's neighbors host al-
most half a million refugees. We have no idea what atrocities
are being committed right now throughout most of Sierra Le-
one, save for what the stray refugees are able to report. If past
experience holds, the darkness that has swept over Sierra Le-
one over the last year has countless victims whose fate we may
never know.
I visited mutilation victims in Freetown and at several ref-
ugee sites in Guinea. Their stories fit a familiar pattern. The
rebels burn down entire neighborhoods, line up men, women,
and children and, one-by-one, chop off their arms and/or feet.
Many of the rebels are child soldiers, typically smoking dope,
and weak enough so that the "choppings" often leave hands
dangling from arms, requiring the victim to finish the job on
himself or herself. Victims reported that the rebels, after per-
forming the mutilations, said: "Go show this to President Kab-
bah. Tell Kabbah to help you now. Kabbah is our enemy."
Some boys are spared mutilation, at least for a while, and ab-
1 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.
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ducted to serve as slave labor to the rebels and as soldiers them-
selves. Large numbers of young girls and women are raped and
kept in sexual slavery until killed. Some victims told me of do-
ing everything the rebels told them to, including surrendering
all of their property and performing menial chores for days, only
then to be chopped or, of the unluckiest, killed. I saw one pre-
teen girl whose eyes had been burned out by rebels pouring
heated plastic into them after having raped and shot her. She
was still extremely traumatized. Another girl of five or six
years old had been thrown into a fire and suffered extreme
burns on the front of her body. Other children were suffering
multiple injuries from gunshot wounds, burnings, and
choppings.
The character of the Sierra Leone conflict is indicative of
what likely confronts the international community in the fu-
ture: an undisciplined force of child soldiers, led by revenge-
seeking rebels and former government soldiers who exercise no
restraint whatsoever in the prosecution of their campaign for
power, and funding of these forces derived from control of dia-
mond concessions; of foreign governments collaborating with
war criminals, of the humanitarian crisis wrought by such crim-
inal behavior. Enforcing the laws of war against such perpetra-
tors, many of whom are children high on dope and untrained in
civilized military discipline, seems almost surreal. Our work
will certainly not be easy.
The United States is trying, along with a few other govern-
ments to seek an end to the hostilities and atrocities in Sierra
Leone and to provide humanitarian relief to the victims. In Fis-
cal Year 1998, the United States Government humanitarian
assistance to Sierra Leone totaled over $55 million, fourteen
times more than our assistance to the West African peacekeep-
ing force. The U.S. is the largest humanitarian donor to Sierra
Leone and so far this fiscal year has provided more than $28
million in humanitarian relief. This assistance includes a re-
cent airlift of 20,000 blankets and 860 rolls of plastic sheeting to
provide temporary shelter to Freetown residents.
Efforts are under way to bring President Kabbah and the
rebels together for peace talks. But the offer for peace talks is
only credible if the rebels realize that the peacekeeping force,
ECOMOG, is strong enough to prevail against them.
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ECOMOG, comprised of mostly Nigerian soldiers, has become a
peace enforcement operation and it should be fully supported
for the purpose of confronting the rebels and stopping the atroc-
ities. The United States has committed more than $10 million
to support ECOMOG and we are looking for additional federal
funds. The United Kingdom is providing up to $16 million in
additional funding for ECOMOG, and the Dutch have provided
some critical assistance recently. But additional support of all
kinds, including arms and ammunition is required. Nigeria,
which is considering pulling out within the next few months,
must be persuaded to stay the course.
I met with the ECOMOG Commander, Major General
Timothy Shelpidi from Nigeria, and discussed with him the al-
leged summary executions of rebels by his soldiers. I recalled
the need for military discipline and enforcement of the rule of
law, which he said would be administered against any soldiers
found to be guilty of crimes. We hope that will indeed be the
case and that the discipline of ECOMOG, which also has troops
from Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, will conform to the fundamental
requirements of international humanitarian law. But these al-
leged incidents need to be kept in perspective in comparison
with the magnitude of atrocities committed by the rebels. The
consequences of a failure by the international community to ad-
equately support ECOMOG in this hour of desperation in Sierra
Leone can be catastrophic, not only for the people of Sierra Le-
one but also for Guinea and the region as a whole. The Sierra
Leone conflict can easily spill over into other West African na-
tions and destroy whatever hope we may have had for regional
peacekeeping efforts.
The role of Liberia, Libya and other African states in sup-
porting the rebels also requires our continued attention and re-
sponse. The diamond trade is attractive to rebel and foreigner
alike. Without foreign support, including mercenaries, the
rebels would be a much weaker force. During my visit to the
region, I stressed to all that any government that supports the
rebels risks becoming a collaborator in the atrocities.
In New York, in March 1999, I briefed representatives of
many of the member states of the U.N. Security Council and
from Africa about the situation in Sierra Leone. The Security
Council is uniquely positioned to evaluate the threat to interna-
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tional peace and security, to encourage support for ECOMOG,
and to energize the proposed peace talks. At stake in Sierra
Leone is democracy, the rule of law, regional security, and the
fate of so many desperate human beings. Our responses to the
atrocities in places like Kosovo and Sierra Leone are tests of
deterring War Crimes in the Twenty-first Century. On Febru-
ary 12th the Security Council held a formal meeting on "Protec-
tion of Civilians in Armed Conflict," chaired by Canadian
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who urged the Council to do
more to protect civilians in armed conflict.
The U.S. representative, Ambassador Peter Burleigh, con-
firmed that, "The United States shares Canada's desire to bring
to international attention the new character of armed conflict,
in which civilians, including humanitarian workers, are often
not simply random, incidental victims of conflict, but its very
targets. We must work together." Ambassador Burleigh also
said, "to find ways to halt this trend we must strive to
strengthen international protection of civilians, recognizing
that the Council's task of maintaining peace and security can
extend to the protection of individuals as well." Ambassador
Burleigh, on behalf of the United States, welcomed the Security
Council's reaffirmation in its Presidential Statement on Febru-
ary 12th of:
the need for the international community to assist and protect ci-
vilian populations affected by armed conflict; of the need for all
parties concerned to ensure the safety of civilians and to guaran-
tee the unimpeded and safe access of United Nations and other
humanitarian personnel to those in need; of the obligation of all
states to comply strictly with their obligations under interna-
tional law; and of the need to bring to justice individuals who tar-
get civilians, as such, in armed conflict, or who otherwise commit
offenses under international humanitarian and human rights
law. We also support the Council's willingness to respond, in ac-
cordance with the UN Charter, to situations in which civilians
have been targeted, or humanitarian assistance to civilians has
been deliberately obstructed. 2
President Clinton announced on December 10th of last year
that the establishment of formal mechanism in the U.S. Gov-
2 U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3977th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/6642 (1999).
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ernment to facilitate early warning of atrocities and to consider
means to prevent or respond to them as quickly and effectively
as possible. This is a tall challenge- one that will take time to
fully establish. As head of the inter-agency group working on
this project, I am determined to craft a permanent working sys-
tem. The Atrocities Prevention Inter-Agency Working Group,
as it is termed, will be a focal point within the U.S. Government
for identifying and coordinating policy responses to atrocities.
Our intelligence community and diplomatic posts will be ac-
tively engaged in identifying the warning signs of atrocities. In-
formation in the public domain from journalists and non-
governmental organizations witnessing what we often cannot
see, will be critical to this effort. We also intend to create a net-
work of relationships with other governments dedicated to the
war against atrocities so that we can alert each other as quickly
and effectively as possible to unfolding events that may merit
collective responses. We have no illusions as to the degree of
difficulty an undertaking of this character will entail and the
criticism it will inevitably attract when we have not met every-
one's expectations of action. But we have a duty to try our best
to confront atrocities head-on. Just yesterday, I held a lengthy
meeting on Sierra Leone to examine our options for action. We
will hold a conference in Washington in October 1999 where
representatives from many governments will be invited to ex-
amine prevention initiatives.
Successful enforcement of humanitarian law requires the
commitment of nations, but prosecutions must ultimately rely
on accurate information. The Atrocities Prevention Inter-
Agency Working Group will be a focal point within the U. S.
Government for identifying and coordinating policy responses to
atrocities. Our armed forces deployed throughout the world will
remain an integral part of our efforts to identify violations of
international humanitarian law and to contain the spreading
conflicts that are the backdrop for those who ignore their legal
obligations. The Department of Defense recently issued a direc-
tive applicable to all United States armed forces. The directive
requires that all possible suspected or alleged violations of the
law of war be documented and reported quickly. The military
commanders on the scene now have a specific duty to take steps
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to preserve evidence of violations, which will then be transmit-
ted to appropriate authorities.
III. WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
Another test of deterrence is the work of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 3 and for
Rwanda. 4 As with the Nuremberg and Tokyo international
criminal tribunals after World War II, it is very difficult to
judge with precision the real deterrence value of such courts.
Unfortunately, the level of criminal activity since 1945 has sur-
passed the worst nightmares of those who prosecuted the war
criminals of that era. But we know that a central purpose of
enforcement of law is deterrence. This is as true on the interna-
tional plane as it is domestically. We have as much a duty to
enforce the rule of law today as our fathers did at Nuremberg
and Tokyo. We too must hope, in this fallible world, that a sig-
nal will be sent to future generations that there will be conse-
quences for those who wage a war of atrocities.
The work of the Yugoslav and Rwanda war crimes tribu-
nals is beginning to show real progress. Thirty-five indictees of
the Yugoslav Tribunal have been taken into custody since 1994.
Currently, twenty-seven are in custody in The Hague. Thirty
indictees remain at large. Of the original eighty-three public
indictees of the Yugoslav Tribunal, seventeen have had charges
dismissed against them and one has been acquitted. Four tri-
als, some with several defendants, are in progress today; three
sets of convictions are on appeal. The 1999 budget for the Yugo-
slav Tribunal was increased by thirty-five percent to a total of
$103 million. This will permit the hiring of 206 new staff mem-
bers and a new chamber of judges to handle an increasing
3 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. S.C. Res. 827, 48th Sess., Annex,
at 40, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (establishing the tribunal) [hereinafter ICTY Stat-
ute], reprinted at 32 I.L.M. 1203.
4 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Terri-
tory of Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S1
Res/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
5 See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The
Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203 (1998).
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caseload and investigative challenge. The apprehension in De-
cember of General Radislav Krstic, who led the assault on
Srebrenica in 1995, signaled our resolve to bring to justice the
highest level individuals indicted by the Tribunal. An impres-
sive number of leaders are in custody in The Hague now. Noth-
ing would serve deterrence better than the swift surrender or
apprehension of those indictees who remain at large. To the
best of our knowledge, there are no known indictees remaining
in the American sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where U.S.
soldiers in SFOR6 operate. We will not rest until every indicted
individual is brought to the bar of justice in The Hague. It is
critical, for deterrence purposes, that these crimes enjoy no
statute of limitations and no weakening in the resolve of the
international community to bring all indictees into custody.
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who remain at large,
must understand that they cannot escape judicial accountabil-
ity for their alleged actions. Nor can the infamous "Vukovar 3,"
who enjoy sanctuary in Serbia along with other indictees, in-
cluding Ratko Mladic.
These are hard tests for international justice. The United
States calls upon other governments, far from the conflict in the
Balkans, to stand with us and the Security Council in pressur-
ing Belgrade to comply with its obligations and to see that in-
dictees on Bosnian or Croat territory reach the Hague. We will
continue to do everything we can. We have demonstrated that
we have the capabilities to undertake to bring indictees to jus-
tice. But we need the sustained support of many other govern-
ments who also believe in the importance of the Yugoslav
Tribunal's work to join us in this critical endeavor.
The Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal has had remarkable
success in apprehending indictees. A large number of the se-
nior political, military, and media leaders in Rwanda, before
and during the genocide of 1994, now sit in the U.N. Detention
Facility in Arusha and are standing or facing trial. Of forty-five
publicly indicted suspects, thirty-six are now in custody. Nine
remain at large. Within just the last two weeks, the former
health minister and the former information minister during the
1994 genocide were arrested in Kenya. Two weeks ago, Ignace
6 NATO-led "Stabilization Force."
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Bagilishema, the former mayor of Mabanza commune in the
Kibuye Prefecture and one of the first leaders indicted by the
Rwanda Tribunal in 1995, surrendered himself to Tribunal au-
thorities in Pretoria. He had been tracked for three years, with
arrest warrants issued by the Governments of Zambia, Austra-
lia, South Africa, and Singapore. The U. S. Government is
working to see that Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, an indictee who
is in federal custody in Laredo, Texas, will be transferred to the
Rwanda Tribunal in Arusha as soon as possible. The case is
currently before the U.S. Court of Appeals.7 The 1999 budget
for the Rwanda Tribunal increased by forty-four percent over
the 1998 budget, and now stands at $75 million. One hundred
and ninety-seven new staff positions are being funded with this
increase, as is a new chamber of judges.
We have been disturbed by reports that certain defendants
have been denied their choice of defense counsel at the Rwanda
Tribunal. I investigated this last year and had been assured
that obstacles had been removed. We trust that in the future
there will be full access to defense counsel, particularly with the
requisite language skills, that defendants merit.
The jurisprudence of both tribunals is beginning to estab-
lish a strong body of case law in the enforcement of interna-
tional humanitarian law. As instruments of deterrence, the
tribunals are formidable partners that cannot be lightly ignored
in the future. The Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal has greatly
advanced the enforcement of international humanitarian law
by holding key leaders-Akayesu, Kambanda, and Serushago
guilty, either by conviction or their own plea, for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed against
their own people and in a purely internal conflict. The conse-
quence has been to strengthen the enforcement of international
humanitarian law.
While on its surface, the September 1998 decision against
Akayesu 8 for the crime of genocide would appear to speak for
itself, a closer examination is worthwhile to show the true ad-
vancement in this decision. Prior to Akayesu, there was no judi-
cial interpretation of the Genocide Convention. The Rwanda
Tribunal's Trial Chamber noted that the definition of genocide
7 Ntakirutimana v. Reno, No. 98-41597, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999).
8 The Prosecutor v. Akeyesu, (1998) ICTR-96-4-T.
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in Article 2 of the Tribunal statute is taken verbatim from Arti-
cles 2 and 3 of the 1949 Genocide Convention.9 As a result, the
judges followed the prosecutor's rationale and gave genocide a
broad interpretation and reading in order to maximize the pro-
tection of a protected group. The Chamber emphasized that the
crime of genocide does not imply the actual extermination of a
group in its entirety, but is understood as a crime of genocide
once any one of the acts in Article 2 is committed with the spe-
cific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group as such. 10 The Chamber made clear
that rape and sexual violence constitute genocide in the same
way as any other act as long as they were committed with the
specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a covered group.1 '
Sexual violence can indeed be an integral part of the process of
destruction. In the past, sexual violence was not recognized by
many scholars or even in the preparatory works of the Genocide
Convention as an act of genocide. This was mainly due to the
fact that society erroneously thought that genocide must encom-
pass lasting physical injury or death.
Further, the Akayesu decision held that rape (as opposed to
the broader offense of sexual violence) may be a crime against
humanity.' 2 In the past, specifically the Tokyo trials after
World War II, rape was mentioned under the umbrella of"inhu-
mane acts," but never itself recognized in any judgment as a
specific crime against humanity. Under the Akayesu decision,
for the first time, rape has stood on its own and alone as a crime
against humanity.13
As challenging as the work in the Balkans and Rwanda re-
mains, we have a collective duty not to forget other arenas of
conflict and atrocities in our own time. The United States has
long supported the establishment by the Security Council of an
9 See id at pt. 6.3.1, para. 494. Article 2 of the ICTR Statute defines genocide
as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." See ICTR Statute, supra
note 5, art. 2. See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The Genocide Convention defines Geno-
cide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." Id.
10 See Akeyesu, supra note 8, para. 497.
11 Id. at para. 508.
12 Id. at pt. 6.4, para. 596-598.
13 Id. at pt. 7.7, para. 685-695.
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international criminal tribunal to bring the senior Khmer
Rouge leaders who remain alive to justice for the crimes of the
Pol Pot regime in Cambodia from March 1975 through January
1979. An estimated 1.7 million Cambodians perished during
that period due to the criminal conduct of the Pol Pot regime.
In light of recent developments and a forthcoming report by a
group of legal experts appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General,
we look forward to concrete action in the Security Council, in
cooperation with the Cambodian Government, to realize this
much delayed mechanism of justice.
As Secretary of State Madeline Albright said in Bangkok
yesterday, "We want the top leaders brought to justice and we
do support an international tribunal on this." She said the
United States believes "that is the way to reconciliation." 14 We
understand that Prime Minister Hun Sen has said that Cambo-
dia is considering a South Africa-style truth commission. As
the Secretary said, we do not believe this is a substitute for an
international tribunal for the 1975-79 period.
Secretary Albright has often remarked that Iraq's Saddam
Hussein is a repeat offender. He and his regime have commit-
ted war crimes on the Iraqi people and on Iraq's neighbors to all
points of the compass. Our policy toward the Iraqi regime is
defined in part by our determination not to let its long history of
criminal conduct prevail. We believe that the Iraqi regime com-
mitted crimes during the invasion and occupation of Kuwait in
1990-91, including crimes against the Kuwaiti people, U.S. and
coalition forces, and through the use of third-country civilians
as human shields. We believe that the Iraqi regime committed
crimes during its campaigns against the Iraqi Kurdish peoples
in the late 1980s and early 1990s in northern Iraq. We believe
that the Iraqi regime committed, and continues to commit,
crimes against the Iraqi Shi'a peoples in its efforts to drain the
southern marshes, and to destroy the unique culture of the
Marsh Arabs.
14 SECRETARY OF STATE, MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT AND THAI FOREIGN MINISTER
SURIN PITSUWAN, JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Bang-
kok, Thailand, Office of Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, (Issued at Joint
Press Conference held on Mar. 4, 1999) (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://secretary.
state.gov/www/statements/1999/990304.html>.
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American and British patrols of the "no-fly zones" began in
part to enforce international humanitarian law. The origins of
the no-fly zones rest in the criminal conduct the Iraqi regime
unleashed upon the Kurds in the north and the Shi'a in the
south. By preventing the Iraqi air force from flying in the two
zones, we blunt the Iraqi regime's ability to repress civilian
groups which unquestionably are under threat by the Iraqi re-
gime. And yet Saddam's propaganda machine would have you
believe that British and American air power is somehow violat-
ing Iraqi sovereignty. Not only do prior Security Council resolu-
tions support the legality of the enforcement of the no-fly zones,
we trust that the international community knows the difference
between true enforcement of the law and the hypocrisy of one of
the worst violators of law in our time.
It is telling that at the Rome conference on the establish-
ment of an international criminal court last summer the most
frequently cited need for an effective international court was
the need to prosecute the future Pol Pots and Saddam Husseins.
Those same governments and non-governmental organizations
need to join us, and others, to focus just as strongly on the pres-
ent Saddam Hussein and the living senior Khmer Rouge
leaders.
IV. U.S. POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
1 5
The United States has had, and will continue to have, a
compelling interest in the establishment of a permanent inter-
national criminal court (hereinafter ICC). Such an interna-
tional court, so long contemplated and so relevant in a world
burdened with mass murderers, can both deter and punish
those who might escape justice in national courts. As head of
the U.S. delegation to the ICC talks since mid-1997, I can con-
firm that the United States has had an abiding interest in what
kind of court the ICC would be in order to operate efficiently,
effectively and appropriately within a global system that also
requires our constant vigilance to protect international peace
and security. Our refusal to support the final draft of the treaty
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
9* [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Portions of Part IV originally appeared in 93 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 12 (1999).
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in Rome last summer was grounded in law and in the reality of
our international system.
On December 8, 1998, we joined consensus in the UN Gen-
eral Assembly to adopt a resolution creating the Preparatory
Commission on the ICC (hereinafter PrepCom) which is meet-
ing now in New York under the expert leadership of Philippe
Kirsch, the Legal Adviser of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. I led the U.S. delegation in the critical work of the
PrepCom to develop the elements of crimes and the rules of pro-
cedure and evidence. The United States has taken the lead in
the elements discussions. In July and August 1999, the
PrepCom will afford an opportunity for concerns we, as well as
others, have had about the effectiveness and acceptance of the
Court to be addressed. This is an important opportunity to cor-
rect the Treaty. We believe the problems in the treaty, which
prevent us from signing it, can be solved. We further believe
that it is in the interest of all governments to address those
problems now so that we can all be active partners in the ICC.
There is far more to lose in the effectiveness of the ICC if the
United States is not a treaty partner than there is to gain from
its current dubious regime of jurisdiction. As I said at the
United Nations last October, we do not pretend to know all the
answers. We hope some creative thinking can be generated in
the months ahead.
At the Rome conference last summer, the U.S. delegation
worked with other delegations to achieve important objectives.
One major objective was a strong complementarity regime,
namely, deferral to national jurisdiction. A key purpose of the
international criminal court should be to promote observance
and enforcement of international humanitarian law by domestic
legal systems. Therefore, we were pleased to see the adoption of
Article 18,16 which is drawn originally from an American propo-
sal, and its companion Articles 1717 and 19.18 We considered it
only logical that, when an investigation of an overall situation
is initiated, relevant and capable national governments be
given an opportunity, under guidelines that respect the author-
16 Id. at art. 18 (Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility).
17 Id. at art. 17 (Issues of admissibility).
18 Id. at art. 19 (Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibil-
ity of a case).
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ity of the court, to take the lead in investigating their own na-
tionals or others within their jurisdiction.
Our negotiators struggled, successfully, to preserve appro-
priate sovereign decision-making in connection with obligations
to cooperate with the court. Some delegates were tempted to
require unqualified cooperation by States Parties with all court
orders, notwithstanding national judicial procedures that would
be involved in any event. Such obligations of unqualified coop-
eration were unrealistic and would have raised serious constitu-
tional issues not only in the United States but also in many
other jurisdictions. Part 919 of the statute represents hard-
fought battles in this respect. The requirement that the actions
of States Parties be taken "in accordance with national proce-
dural law"20 or similar language is pragmatic and legally essen-
tial for the successful operation of the court.
We were pleased that the discussion on the rules of proce-
dure and evidence at the February 1999 session of the PrepCom
was undertaken with a constructive attitude by participating
delegations. Some progress was made, and we trust that the
groundwork has now been laid to accelerate the work on the
rules in the months ahead. The U.S. experience with the Yugo-
slav Tribunal has shown that some sensitive information col-
lected by a government could be made available as lead
evidence to the prosecutor, provided that detailed procedures
were strictly followed. We applied years of experience with the
Yugoslav Tribunal to the challenge of similar cooperation with a
permanent court. It was not easy. Some delegations argued
that the court should have the final determination on the re-
lease of all national security information requested from a gov-
ernment. Our view prevailed in Article 72, which provides: "a
national government must have the right of final refusal if the
request pertains to its national security."21 In the case of a gov-
ernment's refusal, the court may seek a remedy from the As-
sembly of States Parties or the Security Council.
The United States helped lead the successful effort to en-
sure that the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity22
19 See id. pt. 9 (International co-operation and judicial assistance).
20 Id. at art. 89(1).
21 Id. at art. 72 (Protection of national security information).
22 Id. at art. 7.
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included acts in internal armed conflicts and acts in the absence
of an armed conflict. We also argued successfully that there
had to be a reasonably high threshold for such crimes. U.S.
lawyers insisted that definitions of war crimes be drawn from
customary international law and that they respect the require-
ments of military objectives during combat and of requisite in-
tent. We had long sought a high threshold for the court's
jurisdiction over war crimes, since individual soldiers often
commit isolated war crimes that by themselves should not auto-
matically trigger the massive machinery of the ICC. We believe
the definition arrived at serves our purposes well: "The Court
shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular
when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes."23
A major achievement of Article 8 of the treaty is its applica-
tion to war crimes committed during internal armed conflicts.
In order to widen acceptance of the application of the statute to
war crimes committed during internal armed conflicts, the
United States helped broker language that excludes situations
of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar na-
ture.24 One of the more difficult, but essential, issues to negoti-
ate was the coverage of crimes against women, in particular
either as a crime against humanity or as a war crime. The U. S.
delegation worked hard to include explicit reference to crimes
relating to sexual assault in the text of the statute. Rape, sex-
ual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence of compara-
ble gravity were included as crimes. 25 The United States was
also instrumental in creating acceptable definitions of command
responsibility26 and the defense of superior orders. 27
As I mentioned earlier, our emphasis on the elements of
crimes resulted in Article 9 of the treaty, which requires govern-
ments to elaborate on the elements of crime during the
PrepCom. Despite some early criticism directed at U.S. motiva-
23 Id. at art. 8(1).
24 Id. at art. 8(2)(d).
25 Id. at arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi).
26 Id. at art. 28 (Responsibilities of commanders and other superiors).
27 Id. at art. 33 (Superior orders and prescription of law).
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tions, we are pleased that work on the elements paper
progressed well during the first session of the PrepCom and
that there is now a very good basis for making more progress.
We look forward to more constructive and cooperative work
with delegations in the months ahead. We trust that early
skepticism about the intent behind our draft elements has been
put to rest and that serious professional work can now continue
in order to complete the work on elements of crimes as soon as
possible.
These accomplishments and others in the Rome Treaty are
significant. But the U.S. delegation was not prepared at any
time during the Rome Conference to accept a treaty text that
represented a political compromise on fundamental issues of in-
ternational criminal law and international peace and security.
We could not negotiate as if certain risks could be easily dis-
missed or certain procedures of the permanent court would be
infallible. We could not bargain away unique security require-
ments, or our need to uphold basic principles of international
law, even if some of our closest allies reached their own level of
satisfaction with the final treaty text. The United States made
compromises throughout the Rome process, but we always em-
phasized that the issue of jurisdiction had to be resolved satis-
factorily or else the entire treaty and the integrity of the court
would be imperiled.
The theory of universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes seized the imagination of
many delegates negotiating the ICC treaty. They appeared to
believe that the ICC should be empowered to do what some na-
tional governments have done unilaterally, namely, to enact
laws that empower their courts to prosecute any individuals, in-
cluding non-nationals, who commit one or more of these crimes.
Some governments have enacted such laws, which theoretically,
but rarely in practice, make their courts arenas for interna-
tional prosecutions. Of course, the catch for any national gov-
ernment seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction is to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the suspect. Without custody, or the
prospect of it through an extradition proceeding, a national
court's claim of universal jurisdiction necessarily and rightly is
limited.
17
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The ICC is designed as a treaty-based court with the
unique power to prosecute and sentence individuals, but also to
impose obligations of cooperation upon the contracting states.
A fundamental principle of international treaty law is that only
states that are party to a treaty should be bound by its terms.
Yet Article 1228 of the ICC treaty reduces the need for ratifica-
tion of the treaty by national governments by providing the
court with jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party state.
Under Article 12, the ICC may exercise such jurisdiction over
anyone anywhere in the world, even in the absence of a referral
by the Security Council, if either the state of the territory where
the crime was committed or the state of nationality of the ac-
cused consents. Ironically, the treaty exposes non-parties in
ways that parties are not exposed.
Why is the United Sates so concerned about the status of
non-party states under the ICC treaty? Why not, as many have
suggested, simply sign and ratify the treaty and thus eliminate
the problem of non-party status? First, fundamental principles
of treaty law still matter and we are loath to ignore them with
respect to any state's obligations visa-vi a treaty regime. While
certain conduct is prohibited under customary international
law and might be the object of universal jurisdiction by a na-
tional court, the establishment of, and a state's participation in,
an international criminal court are not derived from custom
but, rather, from the requirements of treaty law.
Second, even if the Clinton Administration were in a posi-
tion to sign the treaty, U.S. ratification could take many years
and stretch beyond the date of entry into force of the treaty.
Thus, the United States could have non-party status under the
ICC treaty for a significant period of time. The crimes within
the court's jurisdiction also go beyond those arguably covered by
universal jurisdiction, and court decisions or future amend-
ments could effectively create "new" and unacceptable crimes.
Moreover, the ability to withdraw from the treaty, should the
court develop in unacceptable ways, would be negated as an ef-
fective protection.
Equally troubling are the implications of Article 12 for the
future willingness of the United States and other governments
28 Id. at art. 12 (Preconditions to the exercise of jurisidiction).
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to take significant risks to intervene in foreign lands in order to
save human lives or to restore international or regional peace
and security. The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12,
particularly for nonparties to the treaty, will be to limit severely
those lawful, but highly controversial and inherently risky, in-
terventions that the advocates of human rights and world peace
so desperately seek from the United States and other military
powers. There will be significant new legal and political risks in
such interventions, which up to this point have been mostly
shielded from politically motivated charges.
In Rome, the U.S. delegation offered various proposals to
break the back of the jurisdiction problem. The other perma-
nent members of the Security Council joined us in a compromise
formula during the last week of the Rome conference. One of
our proposals was to exempt from the court's jurisdiction con-
duct that arises from the official actions of a nonparty state ac-
knowledged as such by that nonparty. This would require a
nonparty state to acknowledge responsibility for an atrocity in
order to be exempted, an unlikely occurrence for those who usu-
ally commit genocide or other serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Regrettably, our proposed amendments to
Article 12 were rejected on the premise that the proposed "take
it or leave it" draft of the treaty was so fragile that, if any part
were reopened, the conference would fall apart.
The final text of the treaty includes the crime of aggres-
sion,29 albeit undefined until a Review Conference seven years
after entry into force of the treaty. At that time, state parties to
the treaty will determine the meaning of aggression. This polit-
ical concession, to the most persistent advocates of a crime of
aggression without a consensus definition and without the
linkage to a prior Security Council determination that an act of
aggression has occurred, should concern all of us. The PrepCom
is addressing the issue, however, and we hope it will proceed
responsibly in the years ahead. If handled poorly, this issue
alone could fatally compromise the ICC's future credibility.
I will not belabor the final hours of the conference except to
say that it could have been done differently and the outcome
might have been far more encouraging. While we firmly believe
29 Id. at art. 51(d).
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that the true intent of national governments cannot be that
which now appears reflected in a few key provisions of the Rome
treaty, the political will remains within the Clinton Administra-
tion to support a treaty that is fairly and realistically consti-
tuted. We hope developments will unfold in the future so that
the considerable support that the United States could bring to a
properly constituted international criminal court can be
realized.
V. OTHER PRIORITIES FOR 1999
President Clinton recently reiterated his support to the
Senate for the prompt approval of Protocol II Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, which former President Reagan
transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification
in 1987 but which has not been acted upon. President Clinton
wrote on January 6th of this year that:
[internal conflicts have been the source of appalling civilian suf-
fering, particularly over the last several decades. Protocol II is
aimed specifically at ameliorating the suffering of victims of such
internal conflicts and, in particular, is directed at protecting civil-
ians who, as we have witnessed with such horror this very decade,
all too often find themselves caught in the crossfire of such con-
flicts. Indeed, if Protocol II's fundamental rules were observed,
many of the worst human tragedies of recent internal armed con-
flicts would have been avoided. Because the United States tradi-
tionally has held a leadership position in matters relating to the
law of war, our ratification would help give Protocol II the visibil-
ity and respect it deserves and would enhance efforts to further
ameliorate the suffering of war's victims- especially, in this case,
victims of internal armed conflicts. 30
We hope the Senate will be able to act soon on the President's
request.
Also on January 6th the President transmitted to the Sen-
ate, for its advice and consent to ratification, The Hague Con-
vention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, which the United States signed in 1954, and for
30 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Letter to the Senate on
Hague Convention and Protocol II, (letter dated Jan. 6, 1999) (visited Nov. 1, 1999)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn.pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1991/1/7/3.
text. 1>.
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accession, the related Hague Protocol. 31 The wanton destruc-
tion of civilian, including cultural, property in modern warfare
has not abated. We believe that U.S. ratification of this impor-
tant treaty, already joined by eighty other countries, will send a
strong signal of enforcement to those who wage indiscriminate
warfare.
I also want to stress the importance to the United States
Government of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel, which entered into force on January
15th of this year.32 The United States signed the Convention on
December 19, 1994, and has been fully supportive of its goals
from the time of its negotiation. We are actively working to-
ward becoming a full party to the treaty.
VI. CONCLUSION
These are all daunting challenges. They underscore the re-
alities of an increasingly interdependent world, where Ameri-
can leadership remains constantly on call. I would like to
conclude with President Clinton's emphasis in San Francisco
last week about the need for greater U.S. participation in the
international arena. The President stated that:
we cannot assume today that globalization alone will wash away
the forces of destruction at the dawn of the 21st century, anymore
than it did at the dawn of the 20th century. We cannot assume it
will bring freedom and prosperity to ordinary citizens around the
world who long for them. We cannot assume it will avoid environ-
mental and public health disasters. We cannot assume that be-
cause we are now secure, we Americans do not need military
strength or alliances, or that because we are prosperous, we are
not vulnerable to financial turmoil half a world away.
33
The President continued,
31 See id.
32 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A.
Res. 49/59, 49 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No 49 at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994).
33 See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks by the Presi-
dent on Foreign Policy, Grand Hyatt Hotel, San Francisco, Ca., (Remarks made on
Feb. 26, 1999) (on file with Pace International Law Review) (visited Nov. 1, 1999)
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/urires/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/199 3/3/1/3.
text. 1>.
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[tihe world we want to leave our children and grandchildren re-
quires us to make the right choices, and some of them will be diffi-
cult. America has always risen to great causes, yet we have a
tendency, still, to believe that we can go back to minding our own
business when we're done. Today we must embrace the inexora-
ble logic of globalization, that everything, from the strength of our
economy to the safety of our cities, to the health of our people,
depends on events not only within our borders, but half a world
away. We must see the opportunities and dangers of the interde-
pendent world in which we are clearly fated to live.
3 4
34 Id.
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